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E-mail address: halpern@nceas.ucsb.edu (B.S. HalpSpatial variance in returns from natural resources, driven by resource dynamics and regulations, can have 
strong consequences for equitable delivery of value to individuals and communities. Yet resource man­
agement models implicitly weight returns equally across space, even when space is explicitly included in 
model dynamics and policy. Here we translate ﬁnancial portfolio theory from the temporal to spatial 
realm and use it to quantify the inherent tradeoff between resource returns and social equity, deﬁned 
as a more uniform distribution of resource value across space. We illustrate this approach with a marine 
case study of the Channel Islands, California, USA. Depending on the spatial distribution of resources, 
increasing spatial equity requires nonlinear reductions in resource returns. Realistic management 
options, such as effort-based ﬁsheries regulations or marine protected areas, increase or reduce this 
tradeoff, respectively. We also quantify two critical advantages of portfolio approaches to management: 
they improve outcomes by avoiding false expectations and increase either resource return or social 
equity while maintaining the other. 1. Introduction 
The idea of diversifying one’s assets in order to manage risk 
(variability) and increase returns, i.e. building a portfolio of invest­
ments, has become widely understood and practiced. Yet it was not 
until the pioneering work of Markowitz that portfolio theory was 
developed and mathematically derived (Markowitz, 1952) and a 
decade or two later before portfolio approaches to asset manage­
ment became commonplace. Portfolio theory has since revolution­
ized ﬁnancial, insurance, and capital markets and has more 
recently been applied to diverse ﬁelds such as biodiversity conser­
vation (e.g. Figge, 2004; Koellner and Schmitz, 2006; Tilman et al., 
2006), psychology (Chandra and Shadel, 2006), computer science 
(Huberman et al., 1997), ﬁsheries management (Baldursson and 
Magnusson, 1997; Edwards et al., 2004; Sanchirico et al., 2008; 
Schindler et al., 2010), and forestry (Crowe and Parker, 2008; 
Knoke, 2008), among others. The ecological examples demonstrate 
how portfolio theory can be applied to the management of natural 
capital, i.e. the goods and services provided by natural ecosystems. 
In all of these examples the fundamental guiding principle is that ogical Analysis and Synthesis, 
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ern). individual assets (investment stocks, insurance policies, ﬁsh stocks, 
species, ecosystem services, etc.) respond uniquely over time to 
changes in the system, and therefore one can minimize temporal 
variance (i.e. risk) for a given aggregate level of return by building 
a portfolio of assets that respond differently (i.e. have negative 
covariance) to these changes. 
Analogous to ﬁnancial capital management, resource manage­
ment generally tries to maximize the sustainable delivery of goods 
and services derived from natural capital (i.e. assets = ecosystem 
services) while ensuring consistent supply of these natural re­
sources. What is fundamentally different about resource manage­
ment is that natural resources also have a spatial component of 
variance and covariance in their abundance and value, with 
resources unevenly distributed across land- or seascapes. Many 
resource management problems involve management measures 
which are spatially explicit or allocate access to resources across 
space, with implications for users also distributed across space. 
For example, spatial closures are often used to reduce ﬁshing mor­
tality and rebuild stocks, with the location of those closures dispro­
portionately affecting ﬁshermen who ﬁshed those grounds relative 
to ﬁshermen who ﬁshed grounds that remain open. Although non-
spatial forms of management such as uniform ﬁsheries regulations 
remain common, the trend in marine resource management is to­
wards spatially-explicit methods such as marine spatial planning. 
For a large set of these management problems, there are dual 
objectives of (a) maximizing the total sustainable beneﬁt to 
stakeholders of a given policy and (b) ensuring the equitable 
distribution of beneﬁts to different stakeholder communities with­
in the planning region. Often these goals are mandated by law. 
Even when they are not mandated, there are practical reasons for 
seeking both objectives – maximizing sustainable economic bene­
ﬁt and providing beneﬁt to the greatest number of people has so­
cial value. In many cases efforts to maximize the overall value of 
natural resources favors locations with the highest value, yet if re­
sources are patchy in space then resource users with the best ac­
cess to high-value patches will beneﬁt disproportionately from 
such a management approach (Blaustein, 2007; Jones, 2009). Spa­
tial variance and covariance in resources consequently creates an 
important tradeoff for spatial management decisions (e.g. ﬁshing 
regulations, use permits, etc.); one must balance the desire to 
achieve optimal overall value derived from natural resources with 
the need for spatial equity wherever governments and resource 
agencies have a moral or practical need to make access to and 
delivery of services more equitable among people and communi­
ties (Mutz et al., 2002). 
Social inequity can lead to conﬂicts among individuals or stake­
holder groups and stall or doom efforts to implement management 
reform. The need to address social equity in management decisions 
is widely recognized. The clearest examples occur when sets of 
people are differentially restricted from a resource, e.g. access to 
nature parks, or when groups of people are disproportionately hurt 
by permitted uses of areas, e.g. pollution from zoned industrial 
uses (Blaustein, 2007; Evans and Kantrowitz, 2002; Mascia and 
Claus, 2009). Indeed, compliance with management policies is of­
ten dependent on equitable access to resources, real or perceived 
(Sutinen and Kuperan, 1999). Here we demonstrate a novel ap­
proach to incorporating spatial evenness of ecosystem services into 
resource management decision-making; this approach explicitly 
accounts for social equity in cases where resource users are seek­
ing an even distribution of resource returns across space. We focus 
on equity issues in which patchwork regulations modify access to 
resources within and among user groups in a spatially-explicit 
manner and offer quantitative analytical tools to assess these ineq­
uities. In particular, portfolio theory offers an efﬁcient tool for pro-
actively evaluating the tradeoffs between maximizing return from 
natural resources and maximizing equitability in access to those 
natural resources, providing critical guidance for management 
decisions. 
The underlying premise of portfolio theory is that covariance 
among assets inﬂuences the variance of a collection of assets at 
any given level of return. This will be true when covariances are 
sufﬁciently large (relative to asset variances and returns) that they 
inﬂuence portfolio variance given a desired level of return. Here we 
focus on questions of resource management where human activi­
ties that derive value from the ocean (ecosystem services) are 
the ‘assets’, the value derived is the ‘return’, and where variance 
and covariance are measured spatially. Spatial covariance mea­
sures spatial access to assets by different users and is therefore 
important when management decisions affect multiple resources. 
As governments and agencies move towards ecosystem-based 
management and comprehensive spatial planning (Halpern et al., 
2008; POC, 2003; USCOP, 2004), such cross-sector management 
will likely become much more common, as will tools necessary 
for addressing inherent tradeoffs. Accounting for spatial covariance 
allows resource managers to address issues of equity of access by 
groups using different resources simultaneously and provides a 
means to explicitly assess tradeoffs within and among ocean use 
sectors. Smaller spatial variance represents more even distribution 
of total resource value across space, and often comes at the cost of 
lower portfolio returns. 
To measure the value added by a portfolio approach, its perfor­
mance needs to be compared with solutions that do not use, or are unaware of, covariance. That is, comparisons need to be made to 
traditional, or analyst, approaches where covariance among natu­
ral resources is thought to not exist (‘naïve analyst’) or is known 
but ignored (‘informed analyst’). This evaluation framework leads 
to two types of comparisons: (1) how does the ‘naïve analyst’ ex­
pect to perform relative to the actual results that occur given con­
sideration of covariances among natural resources (portfolio 
approach); and (2) how does the portfolio approach perform rela­
tive to the ‘informed analyst’ where covariances are ignored when 
allocating access to natural resources? The former comparison ad­
dresses false expectations that arise when real consequences of 
covariance are not accounted for, while the latter comparison ad­
dresses the true value added of a portfolio approach relative to 
the analyst approach. Theoretically, the sign and magnitude of 
the covariance values inﬂuence whether the naïve analyst’s expec­
tations exceed or fall short of the informed analyst result (Supple­
mentary Fig. 1). When covariance values are relatively large 
(positive or negative), portfolio solutions are expected to strongly 
outperform the informed analyst, because the portfolio ‘investor’ 
knows to avoid assets (natural resources, or speciﬁc locations) that 
covary strongly and positively and to invest in assets that covary 
strongly and negatively (Supplementary Fig. 1). That is, consider­
ation of covariances helps reduce portfolio variance and achieve 
better returns. The magnitude of returns and variances for individ­
ual natural resources, relative to the magnitude of covariance, also 
will affect the degree to which the portfolio solution outperforms 
the informed analyst (Sanchirico et al., 2008). 
We make three important contributions in this paper. First, we 
demonstrate the application of portfolio theory to resource man­
agement questions where spatial variance in natural capital is 
important. Ultimately natural resource management must con­
sider both spatial and temporal variance simultaneously, but for 
clarity we focus solely on spatial variance here. We illustrate the 
translation of portfolio theory to spatial variance using a marine 
case study based on valuation estimates of several marine re­
sources around the Channel Islands, California, USA. These esti­
mates include two sets of ecosystem services measured in very 
different units, which show how portfolio theory can be applied 
to the spatial management of a diversity of resource types. Second, 
we use the case study to address several questions aimed at under­
standing the consequences of asset covariance that are important 
for the application of portfolio theory within ecosystem-based 
management: (1) what is the nature of the tradeoff between port­
folio return and social equity, when social equity is deﬁned by the 
spatial evenness in access to natural resources? (2) what are the 
costs of failing to account for covariance on management expecta­
tions (the naïve vs. informed analyst comparison) and on actual 
management outcomes (informed analyst vs. portfolio investor 
comparison)? and (3) how does portfolio analysis change optimal 
asset allocation relative to a non-portfolio (analyst) approach? 
Our third contribution is to explore how portfolio theory can guide 
establishment of spatially-explicit management and zoning plans, 
including ﬁshery closure zones. We demonstrate how portfolio 
analyses can be used to compare management options and, impor­
tantly, how the theory can generate spatially-explicit management 
recommendations. We also discuss where and when management 
would likely beneﬁt from the application of portfolio theory and 
highlight key remaining research gaps that need to be ﬁlled before 
portfolio management could be fully operationalized. 2. Methods 
Portfolio approaches to asset management assess the tradeoff 
between expected risk (variance) and return, where return on 
the portfolio (lP) is the sum of total available returns on each asset 
2 
(lj) times its proportion in the portfolio (Xj) across the full range of 
possible asset allocation schemes (N) in the portfolio: 
N 
Xjlj ð1Þ lP ¼
j¼1 
and portfolio variance (r2 P ) is the sum of summed proportional vari­
ances and covariances: 
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Portfolios can be compared based on their return relative to 
their variance, with an ‘efﬁciency frontier’ emerging where the ra­
tio is optimized given constraints in the management scenario (e.g. 
use of no-take zones) and asset data (see below for derivation of 
the efﬁciency frontier). Portfolios with ratios that lie interior to 
the efﬁciency frontier are always sub-optimal decisions, regardless 
of one’s tolerance of risk, since one could increase the return at no 
change in risk or maintain the same return while reducing risk. 
Along the frontier, portfolio selection is based on the desired bal­
ance between return and risk. 
We focused on a case study already subject to extensive re­
search and management efforts, the Channel Islands National Mar­
ine Sanctuary (CINMS), California, USA. We used economic revenue 
data for 14 commercial ﬁsheries (measured in dollars) and human 
use data for seven consumptive and non-consumptive recreational 
activities (measured in person-days) within the CINMS that were 
collected for the process to establish a network of marine reserves 
around the islands in 2003 (Leeworthy et al., 2005). The ﬁsheries 
include wetﬁsh, squid, kelp, urchins, lobster, sheephead, ﬂatﬁshes, 
sea cucumber, seabass, sharks, crabs, prawns, shellﬁsh, and tuna; 
and the recreational activities include charter/party boat ﬁshing, 
charter/party boat consumptive diving, private boat ﬁshing, pri­
vate boat consumptive diving, recreational diving, whale watching, 
kayaking, and sailing. Collectively these resources are termed ‘as­
sets’ here, following the terminology of portfolio theory. Two very 
small marine reserves had existed around one of the islands, Ana­
capa Island, during this time period that likely had negligible effect 
on spatial variance of ﬁsheries or recreation returns; all other man­
agement regulations were uniform across the planning area. Recre­
ation data were collected in 1999, except charter/party boat data, 
which were collected in 2003. Fishery data are an average from 
landings reported from 1996 to 2003 or from 1996 to 1999, 
depending on the ﬁshery. More details on data collection methods 
can be found elsewhere (Leeworthy et al., 2005). Values are re­
ported for 10 blocks (roughly 1.5 x 1.5 km) totaling 3000 blocks 
surrounding the islands (roughly 6700 km2 total). These reporting 
blocks were used as the planning units for our spatially-explicit 
analyses, described below. We analyzed the two classes of assets 
separately to avoid the challenge of comparing assets measured 
in different units, and focus most of our analyses on the ﬁsheries 
data for illustrative purposes. Roughly half the planning area had 
non-zero values for at least one ﬁshery (1736 blocks) or recrea­
tional (1626 blocks) service (Supplementary Fig. 2); for each type 
of asset (ﬁshery or recreational) our analyses focus on this sub­
set of planning units. Delineation of larger areas containing zero-
value planning units is arbitrary and inclusion of these units would 
artiﬁcially affect variance and covariance of assets. We assume 
these historic values represent sustainable levels of harvest. 
Using basic portfolio theory described above we calculated 
returns and variances for 10,000 simulated portfolios. Each portfo­
lio’s ‘investment’ strategy was determined by random assignment 
of the proportion of the total available value of each asset (i.e. ﬁsh­
ery or recreational activity) to be included in the portfolio 
(Xj 2 ½0; 1] for each asset j) across the entire planning region, 
X without indicating speciﬁc values at each particular planning unit. 
Although in practice each portfolio would require speciﬁc spatial 
management, we do not explicitly deﬁne speciﬁc asset values at 
each planning unit because the number of combinations is too 
large to explore numerically (except when Xj is zero or one), and 
only Xj is needed for calculating the portfolio’s return and expected 
variance (via Eqs. (1) and (2)). Thus, implicitly this analysis consid­
ers each 10 block to potentially have any proportional amount of 
the value of each asset ‘delivered’ from that block, and the portfo-
lios represent theoretically possible but realistically difﬁcult man-
agement solutions that would set a unique harvest or access value 
for each asset for each block. This is analogous to ﬁnancial portfolio 
analysis that assesses a full range of investment strategies for any 
possible level of investment across assets and over time. 
For each simulated portfolio, return was calculated as the sum 
of the total potential value of the natural resource across the whole 
planning region multiplied by its randomly assigned proportion in 
the investment, and expected spatial variance was determined in 
relation to proportional investment levels for each resource and 
the spatial variances and covariances of the resources (Eqs. (1) 
and (2)). We computed the portfolio efﬁciency frontier of returns 
and variances, which represents the set of optimal solutions, and 
associated resource proportions by maximizing a multi-criterion 
objective function that simultaneously accommodates return and 
variance, 
Obj ¼ max½alp - ð1 - aÞrp 2 ] ð3Þ 
where the coefﬁcient a 2 ½0; 1] controls the relative weight of return 
vs. variance in the overall objective. Multi-criterion objective func­
tions are commonly used when the goal is to optimize more than a 
single function (Ehrgott, 2005). When a = 1 return is maximized 
without regard to variance, whereas when a = 0 variance is mini­
mized. Portfolio and naïve analyst efﬁciency frontiers were calcu­
lated with and without consideration of covariance values (Eq. 
(2)), respectively. Informed analyst efﬁciency frontier variance val­
ues were calculated using asset proportions, Xj, associated with the 
naïve analyst’s efﬁciency frontier but with asset covariances in­
cluded in the calculation of portfolio variance. Informed and naïve 
analyst solutions were therefore identical in portfolio returns but 
not variances for any set of asset proportions. 
For the ﬁshery category we also explored more realistic man­
agement scenarios that regulated resource extraction effort levels 
nonspatially (affecting the proportion of each species’ value that 
is accessed by ﬁsheries) or included the use of spatially-explicit 
no-take (no-access) closures. For the non-spatial ﬁsheries regula­
tion scenario, we considered two approaches: setting spatially uni­
form effort levels that are equivalent across all ﬁsheries, and 
setting spatially uniform effort levels speciﬁcally for each species. 
In these analyses, portfolio return is calculated with the constraint 
that Xj is equivalent across all patches. With uniform effort equiv­
alent across all species we were able to explore the full range of ef­
fort levels (0–1.0), the outcomes of which delineate the efﬁciency 
frontier. For species-speciﬁc effort we considered outcomes from 
10,000 different combinations of spatially uniform effort levels 
among the species, then identiﬁed the collection of outcomes (i.e. 
management strategies) that delineate the efﬁciency frontier of 
optimal return:variance ratio. We did not explore solutions that 
kept overall return for each asset the same while modifying the 
contribution to this whole from each block as these solutions 
would require increasing the return (in some cases dramatically 
so) from individual blocks, which is not ecologically possible in 
many cases. 
For reserve closures, we set the value of certain blocks to zero 
and varied the number and location of these blocks randomly to 
explore possible management scenarios. 
As with the asset-speciﬁc, effort-based management scenario 
above, we evaluated outcomes and delineated the efﬁciency fron­
tier under management with reserves using numerical simulations. 
We iteratively considered n = 0,  1, 2, 3,  . . ., N planning units to be 
closed to ﬁshing (i.e. in reserves) and, for each iteration, simulated 
10,000 random distributions of reserves across positive-value 
planning units in the domain (N = 1736). For each simulation we 
calculated: (1) cumulative value of landings available to the ﬁshery 
across all species and non-reserve planning units, l , (2) pro-p;reserve 
portion of each ﬁshery’s total return that is in non-reserve areas, 
lp;j;reserveXj;reserve ¼ ;lp;j 
and (3) portfolio variance, r2 P , in relation to Xj,reserve and the spatial 
variances and covariances of the resources. In these analyses 
Xj,reserve is implicitly spatial based on the spatially-explicit siting of 
reserves across the domain. This approach enables us to remain 
within the original portfolio theory framework and maintain a fair 
comparison across the management approaches evaluated in this 
study. We traced the outer edge of return and variance levels pro­
duced by the full set of simulations to identify the spatial portfolio 
efﬁciency frontier (Supplementary Fig. 3). Closing all units to ﬁshing 
(100% marine reserve coverage) dictates Xj = 0 for all j and a result­
ing portfolio with zero return and variance; not closing any units to 
ﬁshing (no reserves) allows Xj = 1 for all j and portfolio return and 
variance are maximized. Consequently, portfolio efﬁciency frontiers 
for solutions that use partial ﬁshing regulations within each plan­
ning unit and those that use no-take reserves meet at their extreme 
ends. A sub-set of no-take reserve portfolio simulations, represent­
ing 20%, 40%, 60% and 80% of the positive-value planning units in re­
serves (n = 347, 694, 1042, 1389, respectively), were plotted to 
present a speciﬁc set of solutions at, and interior to, the frontier 
solutions. 
To evaluate how spatial portfolios actually look on the seascape, 
we mapped a sub-set of possible solutions of portfolio results 
across a range of portfolio return values. We mapped two sets of 
no-take reserve solutions: those from the unconstrained no-take 
efﬁciency frontier (arbitrarily chosen at 14%, 25%, and 37% set-
aside to span a range of values that are often achieved or aimed 
for in MPA networks) and those from a constrained no-take efﬁ­
ciency frontier (ﬁxed percent set-aside). For the constrained solu­
tions, we focused on 25% no-take set-aside to represent a 
common target set-aside for current no-take reserve planning 
efforts. 
Comparison of portfolios can be guided by a risk-adjusted per­
formance index such as the Sharpe Index (Sharpe, 1966), which 
quantiﬁes the ratio of returns to variability (standard deviation): 
l - Rf 
h ¼ p ; 
rp 
where Rf = risk-free rate of return and is set to zero here. The Sharpe 
Index is a common ﬁnancial measure that standardizes expected re­
turn by expected risk along efﬁciency frontiers to help highlight dif­
ferences among management options. We calculated Sharpe Index 
values from management outcomes along the optimal portfolio 
and naïve and informed analyst efﬁciency frontier solutions to high­
light their differences in value. 
In the context of this study, social equity in natural resource 
management is achieved by minimizing spatial variance in the dis­
tribution of asset returns across the planning region. This goal as­
sumes a uniform distribution of resource users across the region; 
in reality users are spatially concentrated and thus have varying 
abilities to access different patches (regardless of a patch’s poten­
tial value once accessed). To account for non-uniform user distri­
bution we re-ran our analyses after modifying the original CINMS revenue data for each patch by the average proportion of revenue 
spent (i.e. the cost) of accessing that patch by users concentrated in 
the three main ﬁshing harbors in the Santa Barbara Channel region 
(Santa Barbara, Ventura and Oxnard; Supplementary Fig. 2). For 
each harbor we assumed the value of the species within a patch 
(species revenue – cost of access) to decrease exponentially with 
increasing distance between the user and the patch; we explored 
multiple exponential relationships of varying strengths (see Sup­
plementary material for equations). We then averaged the values 
among the three harbors, and used this mean value of each asset 
in each patch in our analyses. Thus, under this modiﬁed analysis, 
social equity is achieved by minimizing spatial variance in the dis­
tribution of realized asset returns (value minus cost) to users lo­
cated in Santa Barbara, Ventura and Oxnard harbors. 3. Results and discussion 
3.1. Tradeoff between return and social equity 
Two key results emerge from applying portfolio theory to spa­
tial management questions. First, optimized tradeoffs between 
the value of natural resources and social equity in the spatial ac­
cess to those resources (i.e. the efﬁciency frontier) are concave 
(Fig. 1A; Supplementary Figs. 4 and 5), as predicted by theory 
(Markowitz, 1959). In other words, initial increases in return (i.e. 
ﬁsheries value) can be gained with relatively little cost to social 
equity goals, which is measured by portfolio variance, but further 
increases in return require proportionally greater spatial inequity. 
This tradeoff between return and equity can be represented as 
either the total or marginal cost to portfolio return of greater social 
equity (Fig. 1E). The marginal cost curve shows the decrease in re­
turn for each incremental increase in social equity, and in our case 
study the ﬁnal increments in equity come at a great cost to returns. 
Total cost is the maximum return on the efﬁciency frontier minus 
the return on the frontier associated with a particular variance. It 
allows one to compare the absolute change in return between 
any two levels of social equity, and shows how moderate to high 
levels of equity require signiﬁcant reductions in portfolio return. 
Both methods of measuring cost illustrate why otherwise high-re­
turn (e.g. proﬁtable) resource management decisions can often face 
signiﬁcant stakeholder resistance because they are associated with 
high levels of inequity. 
These analyses highlight a range of solutions; the preferred 
location along the frontier will depend on social and political pref­
erences within the management jurisdiction and the possibilities 
and capabilities for offsetting undesirable increases in social ineq­
uity. Preferences will vary from region to region and can be repre­
sented by ‘‘indifference curves.’’ Where an indifference curve is 
tangent to the frontier, the optimal tradeoff between equity and 
portfolio resource return is achieved for a given community (dis­
cussed further below). Not all solutions are equally achievable be­
cause the ability of resource users to adapt to new regulations can 
vary within communities. One must know the efﬁciency frontier, 
societal preferences for spatial equity vs. overall resource return, 
and the feasibility of options to ﬁnd a socially-optimal manage­
ment solution. Portfolio analysis provides the frontier solutions, 
economic surveys can elucidate societal preferences for risk vs. re­
turn to determine indifference curves, and policy assessments can 
identify which management solutions are feasible. 
A second key result is that many management options lead to 
outcomes that fall below the frontier. These are clearly inefﬁcient 
since other options exist that could increase both social equity 
and overall returns through strategic management that modiﬁes 
harvest or access in different blocks according to the spatial covari­
ance of the resources. Such an approach is being proposed as part 
Fig. 1. Emergent efﬁciency frontiers and the return, risk and composition of frontier solutions for the Channels Islands National Marine Sanctuary case study. Efﬁciency 
frontiers for portfolio (solid line), informed analyst (dotted line), and naïve analyst (dashed line) frontiers are shown for marine services measured in dollars (A) and person-
days (B). Asset compositions for the four points along the frontiers are provided in Supplementary Fig. 9. Values for the Sharpe Index at increasing levels of portfolio return (C 
and D) are also shown. See Methods for details. The total and marginal cost to portfolio return given changes in social equity is shown in (E). Total cost is the ‘mirror image’ of 
the efﬁciency frontier in (A). Insets in A and B show enlarged regions of the efﬁciency frontiers to show areas of greatest divergence between the two frontiers. of marine spatial planning in countries around the world, including 
the US Interagency Ocean Policy Taskforce recommendations (CEQ, 
2010). Delineating the efﬁciency frontier enables one to ﬁnd such 
win–win solutions to replace competing management options that 
are perceived to have tradeoffs but are actually sub-optimal 
choices, i.e. below the frontier. Both results have been shown 
repeatedly in past portfolio analyses but are important to highlight 
in the context of spatial resource management. 
3.2. The consequences of resource covariance 
When the distribution of natural resources is patchy, manage­
ment faces an inherent tradeoff between social equity and overall 
returns. Portfolio theory provides a method for identifying optimal 
solutions and assessing tradeoffs among policies. Indeed, false 
expectations from naïve analyst solutions are signiﬁcantly higher 
than what is likely possible given innate spatial covariance of the 
resources (Fig. 1A and B). In particular, the naïve analyst expects 
a given return with much less risk, or higher social equity, than 
is possible. Such false expectations may be particularly problem­
atic when adjusting management strategies is neither trivial nor 
rapid, and management failure has signiﬁcant political, social, 
and environmental costs. 
In contrast, portfolio solutions always out-perform informed 
analyst solutions because analyst solutions do not account for real 
covariance and the added value of a portfolio approach is always 
positive. The differences in return are relatively small in this case 
study, primarily because the covariances among natural resources 
are predominantly positive and variances of individual resources 
are quite large (Fig. 1A and B; Supplementary Tables 1 and 2). Even 
so, portfolio solutions still out-perform informed analyst solutions 
by up to 5% (Supplementary Fig. 6). This result highlights the abil­
ity of portfolio management to increase overall returns at no added 
cost to social equity (i.e. change in variance). 
Subtle differences between portfolio and informed analyst solu­
tions in our case study are more clearly illustrated after standard­
izing expected return with respect to expected risk (portfolio variance) using the Sharpe Index (portfolio return divided by its 
standard deviation, with risk free return set to zero; Fig. 1C and 
D). This type of standardization focuses attention on the amount 
of extra return that is gained with each increase unit of risk 
(Sharpe, 1966), or in the context of this study, incremental de­
crease in social equity. Larger differences in this index are primar­
ily at low to medium levels of portfolio return, which is expected 
because at these levels variance can be minimized (i.e. social equi­
ty maintained) through strategic investment of small amounts of 
resources that have high returns and low spatial covariances. In 
contrast, large returns can only be achieved by including nearly 
all of each resource, in which case decisions are less strategic in 
relation to covariances and instead guided predominantly by 
returns. 
Differences between the performance of portfolio and informed 
analyst approaches are expected to be more pronounced at higher 
return levels when assets (e.g. ecosystem services) cannot co-oc­
cur. Since they covary strongly and negatively, higher returns in 
one asset come at the cost of much lower returns in another asset. 
This result was not observed here because the assets in our case 
study had relatively small and primarily positive covariances. We 
expect negative spatial covariance to be more prevalent for assets 
tied to more diverse types of natural resources, rather than the 
ﬁsheries-only and recreation-only examples analyzed here. For 
example, water ﬁltration provided by estuarine habitats will have 
a very different spatial pattern than ﬁsheries production (which 
tends to be concentrated on continental shelves), leading to nega­
tive spatial covariance between assets derived from the two. 
It is also instructive to compare solutions derived from a portfo­
lio approach to those under different management scenarios that 
may be more feasible to implement. We compared portfolio solu­
tions to (1) networks of no-take reserves (of varying locations 
and sizes) where all ﬁshing (or other types of activities) is excluded 
and (2) two forms of traditional effort-based, non-spatial regula­
tions (without reserves). Optimal no-take reserve solutions per­
formed signiﬁcantly better than solutions with uniform ﬁshing 

















Fig. 2. Efﬁciency frontiers (lines) and simulated no-take reserve portfolios (points) 
for different management scenarios. Scenarios include optimal portfolio (solid line), 
regulation of effort levels speciﬁcally for each species (dash-dot line), use of no-take 
areas (dashed line), regulation of uniform effort levels across all assets (dotted line), 
and simulated no-take solutions at increasing ﬁxed percentages of no-take area 
(increasing darkness of gray points: 20%, 40%, 60%, and 80% respectively). The star 
(upper right) represents the actual MPA network implemented in 2003 with �19% 
no-take areas. managers to strategically select locations with variance and covari­
ance structure that optimized the portfolio’s return:variance ratio 
(Fig. 2), for example, areas with high return and low variance 
and/or negative covariance. Essentially, one can maintain overall 
return on natural capital while increasing social equity by more 
carefully selecting where resources can be extracted, an approach 
that is not possible through effort-based regulations. In contrast, 
optimal no-take reserve solutions performed signiﬁcantly worse 
than optimal asset-speciﬁc, non-spatial ﬁshing effort regulations. 
Here, the latter policy allows for ﬁne tuning of effort levels for each 
species, which improved the return:variance ratio relative to the 
more blunt all-or-no effort spatial options under reserve manage­
ment. In other words, one can improve portfolio performance by 
more carefully selecting the proportion of each resource to be ex­
tracted, an approach that is not possible solely through creation of 
no-take reserves. It follows logically that all of the more feasible 
management scenarios that we evaluated performed worse than 
the best, but impractical, policy that allocated the optimal (and un­
ique) proportion of each resource to be extracted from each patch 
in the planning region. 
Simulations of four different levels of no-take reserve protection 
(closing 20%, 40%, 60%, or 80% of ﬁshed areas) show two additional 
key results (Fig. 2). First, about half of all no-take reserve solutions 
outperform uniform effort regulations, suggesting a positive role 
for no-take reserves in marine spatial planning. This is consistent 
with other results simulating the performance of no-take reserve 
networks relative to non-spatial management (Airame et al., 
2003). Second, each cloud of points in Fig. 2 ranged substantially 
along the x-axis and minimally along the y-axis, indicating that 
one can achieve roughly similar returns at a given percent of area 
set aside in reserves using a wide range of possible reserve solu­
tions, but with dramatically different levels of social equity. For 
example, when 40% of the planning area is set aside in no-take re­
serves (medium gray points in Fig. 2), optimal management plans 
yield roughly $15 million in return, but social equity across possi­
ble solutions differs as much as three-fold. Consequently, careful 
selection of reserve locations can signiﬁcantly improve social equi­
ty at little cost to portfolio return. 
In 2003 a network of marine reserves was implemented around 
the Channel Islands (star in Fig. 2). This real-world solution is rel­
atively close to the portfolio frontier, which is encouraging but also 
not surprising because economic factors and spatial concerns played an important role in the reserve design process (Airame 
et al., 2003). As noted above, this encouraging result is consistent 
with theoretical expectations that the return is very high where 
analyst and portfolio solutions converge. Furthermore, the real-
world solution sits nearly perfectly atop the 20% no-take efﬁciency 
frontier (light gray points in Fig. 2), indicating that the return:var­
iance ratio of the ﬁnal solution was close to optimal. However, the 
real-world solution was interior to the optimal, unconstrained no-
take portfolio efﬁciency frontier that considers all possible 
amounts of set aside. As a result, the high returns provided by 
the real-world solution came with a higher risk (greater social 
inequity) than was possible with theoretical optimal choices. Mov­
ing left from the star to the no-take efﬁciency frontier in Fig. 2 
illustrates how the same return could have been achieved at much 
lower portfolio variance. That is, a portfolio approach to reserve 
selection could have produced solutions that provided even higher 
return with greater social equity – an economic win–win situation. 
3.3. Mapping portfolio solutions 
To be most useful to management efforts, portfolio solutions 
need to be translated into spatially-explicit management options. 
This is not a trivial task as the modeled optimal portfolio solutions 
apply unique regulations (e.g. allowable catch) for each resource in 
every single planning unit, which is practically infeasible to imple­
ment and enforce. To translate the general results into spatially-ex­
plicit maps, we focused on the no-take reserve solutions. We 
examined representative points on the unconstrained (i.e. any % 
set aside) and 25% no-take reserve efﬁciency frontiers and found 
several interesting results (Fig. 3). First, optimal solutions are scat­
tered and not clustered into zones that would be easy to manage 
and enforce. Including management cost may render these infeasi­
ble, even if they are optimal from a social equity perspective. Clus­
tered solutions such as the actual network of reserves established 
around the islands can produce results near the efﬁciency frontier 
(Fig. 2), but this result has higher social inequity (i.e. high portfolio 
variance) than is theoretically achievable with optimal spatial reg­
ulations. Management constraints such as enforceability or ﬁshers’ 
preferences for different types of management (e.g. McClanahan 
et al., 2008) may therefore severely constrain the ability to achieve 
social equity because optimal management plans may not be fea­
sible. However, using planning tools such as MARXAN that can 
search for solutions that optimize return against costs could be 
used in tandem with our portfolio approaches to ﬁnd solutions 
clumped in space. Second, the speciﬁc locations and pattern of re­
serve closures change signiﬁcantly as one moves along either fron­
tier, suggesting that increasing the desired return on a portfolio is 
not simply a matter of adding area to (or even preserving) existing 
closures. 
Importantly, our approach to analyzing and mapping spatial 
portfolio solutions assumes that social equity increases linearly 
with increased evenness in the distribution of asset value across 
the management. Even distribution of return across space should 
approximate reality at very large and very small spatial scales. In 
the former case, many communities along a large coastline are 
accessing different patches of the ocean for economic value. In 
the latter case, many people have easy access to all the same loca­
tions. However, this assumption may not hold when human popu­
lations or access points for resource stakeholders (such as ﬁshing 
ports) are unevenly distributed. In these cases, social equity would 
be deﬁned heterogeneously across space, and thus would corre­
spond nonlinearly with changes in spatial variance and covariance. 
To assess the implications of this scenario we modiﬁed the value of 
the assets in each patch in relation to the cost of accessing the 
patch by users centralized in three harbors in the planning region 
(Supplementary Fig. 7). Given this modiﬁcation, social equity 
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Fig. 3. Efﬁciency frontiers and simulated portfolios (A) for no-take reserve conﬁgurations representing three locations along the MPA frontier (B–D) and 25% no-take reserve 
efﬁciency frontier (D–F) when regulation of asset investment is via spatial regulation only. The three 25% no-take reserve solutions are overlapped (G) to illustrate how 
priority conservation and ﬁshed locations can be quickly identiﬁed. These results highlight that location matters if you want an MPA policy to create a return-to-risk ratio 
(l:r2) near the true efﬁciency frontier. represented a distance-weighted spatial variance in the distribu-
tion of asset returns to users in Santa Barbara, Ventura and Oxnard 
population centers. Although more realistic, consideration of social 
equity in relation to spatially heterogeneous levels of resource va-lue among user communities did not change the qualitative inter­
pretation of our results (Supplementary Fig. 8). Most importantly, 
the relative performance of the optimal portfolios (i.e. the efﬁ­
ciency frontiers) for the different management scenarios evaluated 
did not change (Supplementary Fig. 8). Furthermore, no-take re­
serve locations associated with points along the no-take reserve 
efﬁciency frontier did not change conspicuously. 
3.4. Practical concerns for spatial portfolio management 
With variance measured spatially, rather than temporally, the 
scales of both the input data (i.e. spatial resolution) and the man­
agement planning area (i.e. geographic scope) are critical. For small 
planning areas or course input data, spatial variance and covari­
ance of assets will be greatly inﬂuenced by the number of planning 
units, primarily because variance stabilizes as sample size in­
creases. At very large planning scales, or for management regions 
that span oceanographic or biogeographic boundaries, variance 
will be naturally higher – this is also the scale at which social equi­
ty concerns begin to play a more important role (for example, the 
equity in catch landed among ports can dramatically affect the via­
bility of a spatial management plan). The relatively small scale of 
our case study masks the fact that it spans a major biogeographic 
boundary, which may create large spatial variance between the 
biogeographic regions and large (incidentally positive) spatial 
covariance among ﬁsheries. Together, these traits contribute to 
the stronger similarity between portfolio and analyst results in 
our analyses. Analyses within separate biogeographic regions 
would likely lead to much larger beneﬁts from the portfolio 
approach. 
Access rights to resources, understood broadly here as access to 
the value of a location for certain uses of the ocean rather than for 
particular individuals, is an increasingly common approach to re­
source management, in particular through zoning regulations and 
marine spatial planning. We have shown here that incorporating 
the spatial variance in the value of resources into management 
plans can improve their overall value and/or the equitable distribu­
tion of that value to stakeholders, but we recognize that efﬁciency 
(and effectiveness) in management is also due to many other fac­
tors, including ease of enforcement, philosophical views of 
whether it is appropriate to limit access to resources to certain 
groups of people, or cheaper (if not as effective) non-spatial re­
forms (such as ﬁshing gear regulations). 
In our translation of porfolio theory from the temporal to the 
spatial realm we used a standard ﬁnancial portfolio theory frame­
work that estimates returns and variances based on an investment 
strategy of assets and their temporal values and covariances. 
Accordingly, we assessed the performance of investment strategies 
with respect to the distribution of assets and their spatial covari­
ances. To remain within the original portfolio theory framework 
spatial management plans (e.g. reserves) were converted to spa­
tially implicit asset investment strategies (Xj). This approach 
helped maintain a robust qualitative and fair quantitative compar­
ison across the different spatial and non-spatial management ap­
proaches evaluated in our study, however it leaves room for 
assessing how expanding the ﬁnancial portfolio theory framework 
to include explicitly spatial investment decisions affects the trade-
off between return from natural capital and social equity across 
space. In particular, we expect exploration of this step to guide 
the actual design of particular management policies (e.g. marine 
reserves). 
Translation of portfolio theory from stocks and assets in ﬁnan­
cial markets to managing ecosystem services, or natural capital, 
provides important insights for management; yet it also poses a 
key practical challenge. Many ecosystem services do not have 
existing markets or simple methods for valuing a given unit of ser­
vice (e.g. spiritual value of protected species), whereas portfolio 
theory has been developed for assets in a common unit of measure 
(e.g. dollars). One means for comparing the value of services is to 
estimate an indifference curve, a representation of bundles of ser­vices for which one has equal preference (Varian, 2005). For exam­
ple, if society had equal preferences for Bundle 1 (X1 level of ﬁshing 
and Y1 level of kayaking) and Bundle 2 (X2 level of ﬁshing and Y2 
level of kayaking), those two bundles would lie on the same indif­
ference curve. Any given curve corresponds to a unique total value 
or utility, but all points on a curve are ‘‘equal’’ from the perspective 
of individual or societal value. Development of these curves re­
quires one to assess relative value of assets, but not necessarily 
to convert that value into dollars. Indifference curves are down-
sloping and typically convex, because per-unit value of goods or 
services generally increases as that good or service becomes scar­
cer. As a result, indifference curves are not a simple linear relation­
ship for which one could scale two services to the same units. 
Estimating indifference curves requires knowledge about an indi­
vidual’s or society’s willingness to pay or willingness to accept dif­
ferent services at the expense of others (Gatto and de Leo, 2000). 
In our analysis there were several other assumptions that 
deviate from reality but were necessary for this initial conceptual­
ization of the problem. For example, we assume that each unit-
value for each sector is equivalent (e.g. one person-day of whale 
watching equals one person-day of sailing), that there are no inter­
actions among assets beyond their covariances, and that variance 
and covariance matrices are static and deﬁned. For ecosystem ser­
vices that are heavily inﬂuenced or determined by biological pro­
cesses (which is true for most services), this latter assumption of 
independence is unlikely to hold true. For example, biophysical 
processes that drive changes in primary productivity can create 
different states of service delivery (e.g., El Niño vs. La Niña condi­
tions), and changes in predator or prey abundances due to manage­
ment decisions will likely cascade through the food web and thus 
alter covariance structure in response to portfolio choice, in turn 
affecting the temporal variance of each individual resource. The 
ﬁnancial world is rich with methods for dealing with temporally 
dynamic variance and covariance in portfolios, such as autoregres­
sive conditional heteroscedasticity (ARCH) and related models 
(Bollersley, 1986; Engle, 1982). Translation of this theory into the 
combined spatial–temporal realm is an important future research 
avenue. 
3.5. Conclusions 
The application of portfolio theory to natural resource manage­
ment provides a powerful and ﬂexible tool for allocating human 
uses spatially in a way that optimizes the tradeoff between return 
on natural capital and equitable spatial returns from resource use. 
In particular this approach allows one to identify a collection of 
optimal management options and thus highlights the vast majority 
of policies that are inferior. Portfolios are derived from assessments 
of spatial variance and covariance but do not necessarily prescribe 
the exact spatial allocation of those uses, only the proportion of the 
portfolio that is comprised by each use. Decisions about how to 
achieve those proportions are represented by constrained, but 
more feasible management scenarios. In our case study, we ex­
plored various constrained scenarios and illustrated one method 
for identifying potential priority conservation (no-take reserves) 
and ﬁshed areas (overlap solutions, Fig. 3G). Additional constraints 
are clearly possible, such as choosing core reserve locations and 
then building larger zones around those locations (i.e. a criterion 
of adjacency), but may come with signiﬁcant costs to social equity. 
Furthermore, some allocation criteria may produce solutions that 
are sub-optimal, providing a useful check on the costs or beneﬁts 
of different decision rules relative to portfolio management. 
In general, efforts to optimize the spatial allocation of human 
activities have focused on single assets or sets of very similar assets 
or have used an additive approach that ignores service covariance. 
Such service-by-service approaches are clearly necessary in 
moving towards more comprehensive management, yet portfolio 
theory suggests they will often be sub-optimal to formal portfolio 
approaches, particularly in terms of achieving equitable distribu­
tion of a suite of services across space. As more data on the spatial 
delivery of marine ecosystem services and their valuation become 
available, portfolio analyses will hopefully become more common 
place. The recent interest in ecosystem-based management and 
marine spatial planning (e.g. ocean zoning) at various local, na­
tional, and international levels presents an important opportunity 
to apply portfolio solutions to management plans. 
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